The Office of the Attorney General William Tong
Formal Opinions
Page 40 of 42
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This is in response to your request for a formal opinion regarding the current reimbursement system for wheelchair accessible livery under the Department of Social Services (DSS) regulations enacted in 1989.
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Your office presented us with the following two questions relating to Section 51 of 1994 Conn. Pub. Act No. 94-4 of the May Special Session now codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-62h: 1) Is a municipality required to revalue all real property for property tax purposes by taking all the normal and necessary actions involved in the revaluation of real property, before its legislative body may vote to stay the implementation of said revaluation? 2) Does this legislation allow a municipality to defer beginning the process of revaluation until after the conclusion of the 1995 session of the General Assembly?
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We are responding to your request for advice as to how a December 8, 1994 informal opinion to former Commissioner Nicholas Cioffi regarding the Department of Public Safety Division of Fire, Emergency, and Building Services' civil regulatory jurisdiction over certain activities on the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation ("Reservation") would "impact the services" your agency provides with respect to boxing on the Reservation.
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This letter responds to yours of December 29, 1999, in which you ask this office for a formal opinion regarding the applicability and effect of Sections 26 and 45 of Public Act 99-2, June Special Session on tobacco settlement monies. Specifically, you have asked for an opinion "concerning whether Section 45 alters, in any way, the express provisions of Section 26 and, if so, the nature and extent to which it does."
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You recently requested an opinion from this office regarding the following questions: 1. Is the filing of a notice and fee by a federally-registered investment adviser under Section 36b-6(d) or 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes, for which a letter of acknowledgment is issued by the Department, considered to be a "license or permit to operate a business in this state" within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act? 2. Is the filing of an annual notice renewal fee by such an investment adviser under Section 36b-6(e) of the Connecticut General Statutes considered the renewal of a license or permit within the meaning of Section 31-286a(b) of the Act? 3. If the response to either of the foregoing questions is yes, is Section 31-286a(b) of the Act preempted because it exceeds what is reserved to the states under Section 307(a) of NSMIA, viz., the filing by federally-registered investment advisers of any documents filed with the SEC? 4. If it is determined that Section 31-286a(b) of the Act is preempted, will the Department be liable for failure to comply with Section 31-286a(b) if it fails to obtain from federally-registered investment advisers sufficient evidence of current compliance with the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of Section 31-284?
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This is in response to your request for an expedited opinion on the proposal of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation (CLC) to participate in a new multi-state lottery game which, in part, lets players appear on a televised game show to compete and win.
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In your letter dated August 31, 2000, you asked whether the state can recover interest from the United States Postal Service as a result of the late delivery of certified mail containing tax returns and $140 million in tax payments. In analyzing this issue, it must be noted that any action against the United States Postal Service is, in fact, an action against the United States.
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This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether the two-store limit rule in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-48a bars the issuance of a package store permit to Jaimax, Inc. for premises at 701 North Colony Road, Wallingford, CT.
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You have asked our opinion on whether a firefighter injured in the line of duty on April 5, 1997 is eligible for benefits from the Connecticut State Firefighters Association under the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-123, as amended by Public Act 98-263.
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This is in response to your letter dated January 19, 2000, in which you request our opinion on whether the Department of Transportation ("DOT") has the authority to enter into major contracts regarding development at Bradley International Airport ("BIA") when the Bradley International Airport Commission ("Commission") believes that DOT has failed to fully cooperate with the Commission in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 15-101s of the Connecticut General Statutes.
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You have written to this office seeking an interpretation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §12-63c(a), a statutory provision concerning the procedure local tax assessors are to employ in the valuation of commercial and industrial property used "primarily for purposes of producing rental income." Specifically, you ask whether the term "primarily" as used in this provision means "that more than 50% of the area of the structure is used for the purpose of producing rental income, or does 'primarily' mean that more than 50% of the income from the property is a result of rental income?" You posed a second question that stated: "If the second interpretation is correct, would gross or net income be used to determine the primary purpose?"
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You have asked what regulatory authority the Elections Enforcement Commission ("EEC") has with respect to alleged violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. §2-30a(b), which provides in relevant part: "No expenditure of state funds shall be made to influence electors to vote for or against any such proposed constitutional amendment."
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I reviewed the questions that you have presented to me as follows: 1. Must an HMO medical plan, the terms and conditions of which contain a custodial care exception, offer a plan to the public, after receiving Department of Insurance approval, that: (a) meets the requirements of CGS 38a-553(c)(10), (b) complies with CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended, and Article XXI of the Connecticut Constitution, and (c) does not use rehabilitation or improvement as criteria in determining whether care for disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions is to be considered custodial? 2. Must the external appeal panel, acting pursuant to CGS 38a-478n, when reviewing appeals certified by the Department of Insurance and which construe or involve the custodial care exception (CGS 38a-553(c)(10)) as applied to disabled persons or persons suffering from biologically-based mental illnesses or nervous conditions (CGS 38a-478 et seq., as from time to time amended): (a) apply said CGS 38a-478 et seq. and Article XXI of the State Constitution, and (b) not use rehabilitation or improvement as tests for custodial care?
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You have inquired whether the State has authority to establish standards for air emissions which are stricter than those established under the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq. You have also inquired whether the cost of establishing more stringent standards must be borne by the State.
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You have asked for our opinion on whether towns can spray for mosquitoes in areas in which the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) does not intend to spray and whether towns can prevent the state from conducting its own spraying program within town boundaries.